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During the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa an expert panel was established on the instructions
of the UK Prime Minister to identify priority pathogens for outbreak diseases that had the potential to
cause future epidemics. A total of 13 priority pathogens were identified, which led to the prioritisation
of spending in emerging diseases vaccine research and development from the UK. This meeting report
summarises the process used to develop the UK pathogen priority list, compares it to lists generated
by other organisations (World Health Organisation, National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases) and summarises clinical progress towards the development of vaccines against priority dis-
eases. There is clear technical progress towards the development of vaccines. However, the availability
of these vaccines will be dependent on sustained funding for clinical trials and the preparation of clini-
cally acceptable manufactured material during inter-epidemic periods.1. Introduction
The re-emergence of Zika virus since 2007 and the 2013–2016
Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlighted the risks that epidemic
infectious diseases still pose. The outbreaks stimulated a re-
examination of priorities in research and development of vaccines
to these diseases at national and international levels. The UK Vac-
cines Research and Development Network (UKVN) was set up
under the instructions of the British Prime Minister in 2015 and
an expert working group (WG1) was convened to map the priority
pathogens capable of causing future epidemics. A subsequent
meeting of the group occurred in 2017 and progress and revised
priority pathogens were considered. This report summarises the
findings of both meetings and reviews the international emerging
disease vaccine research and development landscape.
6242 R.J. Noad et al. / Vaccine 37 (2019) 6241–6247The 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak marked a paradigm shift in the
attitude of governments and international organisations to high
impact epidemic infectious diseases. Prior to this, disease epi-
demics had been dealt with on a largely reactive basis, with co-
ordinated development of disease control strategies, vaccines and
antiviral drugs occurring only in response to large scale outbreaks.
Although good academic research on the trends in emergence and
basic biology of outbreak diseases was often available, it almost
invariably stalled at the level of demonstrating that immunogens
were effective in small scale trials in animal models [1–3]. The
Ebola virus outbreak has followed the pattern of intensification
of research effort following major outbreaks previously seen with
other diseases (such as SARS and MERS coronaviruses). For exam-
ple, a search of NCBI PubMed for ‘Ebola vaccine’ reveals 240 origi-
nal scientific reports (excluding review articles) in the 37 year
period 1976–2013 compared to 612 reports in a 3.5 year period
between 2014 and July 2018. However, there is some hope that
there will be co-ordinated clinical research for epidemic diseases
following this outbreak and, critically, technology transfer to pilot
methods suitable for large scale vaccine manufacture before large
outbreaks of other pathogens arise.
Although there remain questions regarding the long term sus-
tainability of commercial vaccines for emerging (and potentially
emerging) epidemic diseases, some of the factors that previously
limited vaccine development beyond a small laboratory scale are
now being addressed. The possibility of conducting phase II/III
clinical trials during an outbreak, at least as part of a ring vacci-
nation strategy, has been demonstrated [4–7]. This has high-
lighted that prototype vaccine trials need to be better
integrated into emergency response protocols during an outbreak
[8,9]. The caveat to this is that such trials need to be very care-
fully managed and communities affected must be actively
engaged to prevent misunderstandings about what researchers
are doing [10,11]. Also, performing research during an outbreak
presents extra challenges compared to similar research con-
ducted on endemic diseases. Partnerships between researchers
and local health authorities need to be quickly and effectively
established; local regulatory and ethical approval must be
granted for any vaccination trial; ideally local physicians should
be recruited to deliver the vaccine and monitor patients; some-
times these factors are additionally complicated by a lack of local
infrastructure (power, water, internet access) hampering storage
and administration of large batches of vaccine [8,12,13]. A funda-
mental problem for funding trials for vaccines to emerging epi-
demic diseases with outbreak potential is that such vaccines
are not commercially attractive prior to an outbreak, or during
inter-epidemic periods. Given the costs and extended timeframes
of developing, licensing and manufacturing a new vaccine it is
understandable that the commercial priority lies with endemic
diseases in wealthy countries where there is a predictable market
for the vaccine every year [14]. Emerging and outbreak diseases
are sporadic by definition and although outbreaks can be large
there can be long periods between outbreaks and therefore there
is no guaranteed market for the vaccine product. In this context,
the willingness of governments and inter-governmental organisa-
tions such as WHO to support commercial scale vaccine develop-
ment and to invest in establishing a bank of experimental
vaccines is key to preparedness for future outbreaks. It is impor-
tant that the international community develops a strategic
approach to avoid duplication and ensure all gaps are covered.
Obviously the United States Government and other agencies have
their own unique additional objectives to address vaccines for
bioterror agents. Overall, WHO and the Coalition for Epidemic
Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) are in a good position to pro-
mote a cooperative approach to emerging disease vaccine
development.2. Process used to generate the UKVN priority list
As with all publicly funded initiatives limited resources demand
prioritization of pathogens targeted for vaccine development. In
the case of the UKVN, prioritization was based on expert review
of available information on diseases that represent a known or
potential threat for an epidemic disease cross referenced with
the state of vaccine availability for those diseases. Specific criteria
for inclusion on the list included: case fatality rate (CFR) and dis-
ability burden of disease, regularity of outbreaks, evidence for geo-
graphical spread, zoonotic impact and ease of transmission from
animal hosts to humans where the disease was zoonotic, potential
for human-to-human transmission, availability of diagnostic plat-
forms and existing investment and development stage of current
vaccines, and finally whether there was evidence that the infec-
tion/disease could be treated effectively through another
intervention.
The review panel included individuals with expertise in epi-
demiology and vaccine development, as well as infectious disease
experts in human and animal health, and representatives of major
UK funding bodies (MRC, BBSRC, Wellcome Trust, Department of
Health and Social Care). The panel specifically focussed on diseases
with the potential to cause high impact epidemics in humans. Ani-
mal diseases were only included in the consideration when they
had substantial zoonotic potential (for example, Rift Valley Fever).
Influenza A virus was excluded on the grounds that there were, and
remain, separate funding routes for the development of vaccines
for emerging pandemic Influenza A subtypes. A long list of epi-
demic diseases for which no suitable vaccine was available was
devised, and subsequently reduced to a list of 14 priority patho-
gens by the scientific experts on the panel by a voting system
(Fig. 1). Based on its late stage of commercial vaccine development
Dengue virus vaccine research was subsequently deprioritised. A
total of £101 million (US$131 million), from the £120 M UKVN
allocation, was spent on funding specific projects addressing the
initial priority list and the original list was again reviewed after
two years to identify any gaps or revisions necessary.3. Comparison of priority lists between organisations.
In addition to the UKVN, other organisations around the world
have undertaken similar outbreak pathogen prioritisation pro-
cesses. WHO generated a list of 8 priority pathogen groups in
2015, which it reviewed in 2017 and 2018 [15]. The criteria for
assessing prioritisation used by WHO was based on 8 criteria
(Human transmission; Medical countermeasures; Severity or case
fatality rate; The human/animal interface; The public health con-
text of the affected area; Potential societal impacts; and Evolution-
ary potential). This WHO blueprint has been the basis for the
selection of priority diseases for vaccine development by the
numerous funding agencies, including CEPI. The US National Insti-
tute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) also prioritises
pathogens based on transmission, mortality and requirement for
public health preparedness. Although it does not specifically take
into account availability of vaccines, the NIAID priority A list does
include many of the pathogens that are outbreak type diseases
[16]. As might be expected given the similar focus of these organ-
isations on the promotion of human health, there is considerable
overlap between these lists (Fig. 2). The bunyaviruses Rift Valley
Fever and Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever, filoviruses Ebola
and Marburg, and the paramyxovirus Nipah, arenavirus Lassa
fever, and coronavirus Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, appear
on all the priority lists. Only WHO also includes Hendra and Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus. UKVN includes Chikun-
gunya and Q fever, and NIAID includes smallpox, anthrax, botulism
Fig. 2. Priority pathogens compiled from WHO Blueprint (blue), Coalition for
Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (Orange), UK Vaccine Research and Develop-
ment Network (purple), National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease Priority
A list.
Fig. 1. Process used to generate and revise the UKVN priority list for outbreak diseases. The initial review was based on expert review of epidemic potential, vaccine
availability and current therapies. This was revised after two years to take into account vaccine progress, new information and new outbreaks. The current priority list is
shown on the right hand side of the figure. MERS- Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, CCHF- Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever.
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narito and Chapare viruses) in its priority A list. Hantavirus and
plague are shared between the NIAID and UKVN lists only, and
the emergence of an as yet unknown disease (Disease X) is specif-
ically accounted for in the WHO Blueprint, CEPI and UKVN lists.
These differences reflect both the different priorities of the organ-
isations compiling the lists and the uncertain nature of prioritising
diseases that are not currently, or are only intermittently, a prob-
lem in different parts of the world. Very often the differences
between lists is the result of small variations in the perceived risk
of diseases by members of the review panel. In part, this is a con-
sequence of the fact that surveillance data for many outbreak dis-
eases is limited and the most important drivers contributing to
outbreaks are poorly characterised. For example, the UKVN priori-
tised Hantavirus, plague, Chikungunya and Q fever were all on the
WHO long list, while Hendra and SARS were on the UKVN long list
but not the final list. Future prioritisation exercises would be facil-
itated by better surveillance information for all priority diseases.
This would include serosurveillance data in ‘at risk’ populations,
where they can be identified, to assess whether changes in immu-
nity at a population level can be linked to the risk of an outbreak.4. Progress towards disease control
Since the onset of theWest African Ebola virus outbreak in 2013
there has been some notable progress towards the control of some
of the diseases on the priority lists, particularly Ebola virus. In
2015, there was no approved vaccine for Ebola virus and arguably
this lack of an effective vaccine for use in emergency situations was
one of the factors that contributed to the size and duration of that
outbreak. While effective vaccines were produced and tested dur-
ing the outbreak [4–6,17], which may prove important in future
control, they were available too late to make a significant impact
on disease control in 2013–2016 [18]. It is notable that the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo, which has had repeated Ebola virus out-
breaks since 1976, had outbreaks in both 2014 (before vaccines
were available) and 2018, after vaccines had been tested in West
Africa. During the 2014 outbreak in Djera there were 66 cases
and 49 deaths. During the 2018 outbreak in neighbouring Bikoro,
Iboko, Wangata and Ntondo by June 14 there were 66 cases but
only 28 deaths (14 from confirmed Ebola cases). By the same date,
2730 people in the country had been vaccinated with the rVSV-
ZEBOV vaccine using a ring vaccination strategy [19]. Additionally,
for the current the current outbreak in the east of DRC over 170
000 people have been vaccinated. As always, it is particularly chal-
lenging to assess the impact of vaccination for a disease in an out-
break situation, in particular to quantify the cases that do not occur
due to vaccination rather than the number of observed cases.
Unlike an endemic disease, where there is a baseline disease inci-
dence, an emerging epidemic disease is by its nature relatively
unpredictable in the number of cases that will occur without inter-
vention. During a ring vaccination trial in Guinea, 10 cases of Ebola
occurred where vaccination was delayed in contrast to no cases,
after 10 days, in vaccinated individuals where vaccination provi-
sion was immediate, thus providing evidence the vaccine may save
lives [5]. In addition to the rVSV-ZEBOV vaccine, several other
promising EBOV vaccines have undergone clinical or pre-clinical
development since 2015 (Table 1).
For the other pathogens on the UKVN priority list the progress
towards clinical development of vaccines has been mixed. There
is now a licensed tetravalent Dengue vaccine manufactured by
Sanofi Pasteur, which is a recombinant virus based on the yellow
Table 1
Vaccines reported as tested clinically against UKVN priority diseases.* where peer reviewed results are available the reference has been included, otherwise the ClinicalTrials.gov
identifier has been listed. rV = Recombinant virus vaccine, iV = Inactivated virus vaccine, iB = inactivated Bacterial vaccine, VLP = Virus like particle vaccine, Sub = Subunit vaccine,
N = Nanoparticle, IgG = Therapeutic antibody, DNA = DNA vaccine, VSV = Vesicular stomatitis virus, Ad5, Ad26 = replication defective Human Adenovirus type 5 and type 26
respectively, ChAd1 = Chimpanzee Adenovirus type 1, ChAd3 = Chimpanzee Adenovirus type 3, MVA = Modified Vaccinia virus Ankara, CHIKV = Chikungunya virus,
CCHF = Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever virus, RVFV = Rift Valley Fever Virus, SARS = Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, MERS = Middle East Respiratory Syndrome.
Pathogen Vaccine Type Backbone Trial level Manufacturer References/Clinical trials
reference*
Ebola virus rVSVDG-ZEBOV-GP rV VSV II/III* Merck [4,5,50]
Ad26.ZEBOV, MVA-BN-Filo rV Ad26, MVA III Janssen Vaccines & Prevention NCT02543567
Ad5-EBOV rV Ad5 II CanSino Biologics Inc [7]
ChAd3-EBO-Z, rV ChAd3, II NIAID/GSK [4,36]
EBOV-GP N I NovaVax NCT02370589
Marburg Virus MVA-BN-Filo rV MVA III Janssen Vaccines & Prevention NCT02543567
Hantavirus HTNV/PUUV DNA plasmid I/II US Army NCT02116205,
NCT01502345
Hantavax iV ROK 84/105 strain III Green Cross Corporation, ROK [24]
HFRS iV HTNV + Seoul Virus IV Zhejiang Weixin Bio-Pharmaceutical Co.,
Ltd., China
[25,26]
Chikungunya MV-CHIK rV Measles virus II Themis Bioscience [37], NCT03101111
CHIKV VLP VLP CHIKV II PaxVax Inc NCT03483961
VRC-CHKVLP059-00-VP VLP CHIKV I NIAID [38]
ChAdOx1 Chik rV ChAd1 I University of Oxford NCT03590392
Plague rF1V vaccine Sub – II DynPort Vaccine Company LLC NCT00332956
Plague vaccine Sub – II Lanzhou Institute of Biological Products
Co., Ltd, China
NCT02596308
Rift Valley Fever MP-12 V RVFV II US Army NCT00415051, [28]
TSI-GSD 200 iV RVFV II US Army NCT00584194
Zika VRC-ZKADNA090-00-VP,
VRC-ZKADNA085-00-VP
DNA plasmid I NIAID NCT02996461,
NCT02840487, [39]
VLA1601 iV Zika I Valneva Austria GmbH NCT03425149
ZPIV iV Zika I US Army [35]
MV-ZIKA rV Measles virus I Themis Bioscience GmbH NCT02996890
MERS SAB-301 IgG – I SAB Biotherapeutics [41]
MVA-MERS-S rV MVA I University of Hamburg NCT03615911
ChAdOx1 MERS rV ChAd1 I University of Oxford NCT03399578,
Q fever NDBR 105 iB – I US Army NCT00584454
CCHF KIRIM-KONGO-VAX iV CCHF I Tubitak NCT03020771
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over antibody dependent enhancement of disease, this vaccine is
only recommended for particular age groups in endemic areas
who have been pre-screened for antibody responses indicating
prior Dengue exposure [22]. A second attenuated tetravalent Den-
gue vaccine is under development by Takeda and has shown
promising results in a phase 2 clinical trial [23]. There are now
two licensed inactivated hantavirus vaccines which are available
in South Korea (Hantavax), and China (HFRS vaccine) [24–26],
but these vaccines are not available elsewhere. Inactivated plague
vaccines have been manufactured since the 1890s [27] however
there are currently no vaccines of this type being marketed. In
terms of new vaccines against plague, there are two candidates
that have reached phase 2 clinical trials (Table 1) both are subunit
vaccines based on recombinant F1 and V plague antigens. Phase 2
trials have also been completed for vaccines against Chikungunya
and Rift Valley Fever virus, although the Chikungunya vaccines
are likely to reach the market faster since their development is
being driven by commercial organisations. The RVFV vaccines were
tested by the US Army and therefore may not be immediately
available for the general population [28]. It is interesting to note
that new RVFV vaccines are being developed for animal vaccina-
tion but to date there have been no trials of these vaccines in
humans [29–31]. Vaccines for other pathogens on the UKVN list
are less well developed, immunogens for ZIKV, SARS, and CCHF
have all reached phase I clinical trials. In the case of ZIKV there is
also a good chance that these will be taken forward for more
advanced clinical testing. Encouraging preclinical vaccine data
exists for CCHFV [32] and in the 1970s the Bulgarian Ministry of
Health produced a vaccine based on an inactivated CCHFV but no
reliable human efficacy data exists. More recently a Turkish forma-lin inactivated vaccine has been reported to have been tested clin-
ically in humans (Table 1). There is a Q fever vaccine that is
available in Australia manufactured by Seqirus that is reported to
be effective [33,34], however the vaccine is not currently licensed
in other countries. For Lassa and Nipah no vaccine for use in
humans has progressed beyond pre-clinical testing. However, CEPI
has recently funded five large vaccine programmes for Lassa which
are likely to lead to early clinical trials. One of the key observations
emerging from consideration of existing and new vaccines is that
differences between countries in the licencing process and the
level of prior efficacy data required substantially affects the time
new vaccines take to reach the market.
In terms of vaccine technologies, a range of different approaches
have proven effective. Inactivated virus vaccines have been shown
to be effective for a range of priority pathogens [24,25,35] and
arguably have the lowest level of technology development
required. The drawbacks are the safety issues related to growing
and preparing hundreds of litres of highly pathogenic virus, the
potential for incomplete inactivation, and the requirement for mul-
tiple doses of vaccine to achieve immune protection. Recombinant
virus vaccines, where the genome of one virus is modified to
express antigen(s) from another pathogen have also been very suc-
cessful, with VSV, MVA, human and chimp adenoviruses, and
measles all effective for the delivery of foreign antigens to stimu-
late strong immune responses [5,7,36,37]. The use of measles vec-
tored vaccines has the additional advantage that it may provide
some additional protection against an endemic human disease
(measles). Subunit and VLP vaccines for plague and Chikungunya
have also been tested in clinical trials [38]. There is also some
evidence that nucleic acid (DNA, mRNA) based vaccines can be
immunogenic in humans for some diseases [39,40]. Although not
R.J. Noad et al. / Vaccine 37 (2019) 6241–6247 6245strictly vaccines, the development of therapeutic antibodies that
can be used post exposure during an outbreak, such as those
developed against MERS coronavirus, may be particularly useful
for outbreak type diseases provided that they are effective in the
field [41].
5. Outstanding challenges
Significant challenges remain for the control of epidemic dis-
eases, despite more clearly defined priorities in terms of pathogen
selection. In particular, early identification and reaction to an out-
break is critical [18], there is a need to provide sustained invest-
ment in surveillance for disease outbreaks. Maps that predict
outbreak risk may help to guide resource allocation with respect
to infrastructure development and surveillance. The need for
surveillance is further complicated by the requirement to monitor
‘Disease X’ [15], the previously unknown pathogen that can have
major impacts on health during an outbreak. Recent advances in
sequencing technologies have led to the identification of many pre-
viously unknown viruses [42–44]. This is likely to increase even
further with efforts to sequence DNA and RNA from other eukary-
otes including wildlife. While most of these new viruses do not
pose a threat to human health, identifying those that do in a timely
manner is one of the major challenges of modern surveillance. This
underlines the importance of international collaboration including
with low income/endemic disease countries. Another challenge is
that of implementing the Nagoya Protocol with respect to the
use of samples from low and middle income countries. Previously,
countries could control the physical export of samples to ensure
that there was agreement on how samples could be used. With
the advent of portable sequencing devices that can be used in
the field [45–49] and gene synthesis technologies it is now possible
to design and produce a new vaccine starting with only sequence
data, without physical transfer of material.
Currently there are relatively few diseases caused by bacteria
that appear on the priority list. This is largely related to the effec-
tiveness of antibiotic treatments. However, the threat of emer-
gence of a previously unknown disease must be balanced against
that of emergence of antimicrobial resistance in known bacterial
pathogens.
Technical challenges around unwanted adverse effects of vacci-
nes such as those associated with dengue vaccines [21] and the
development of vaccines useful in resource poor settings are real,
but are likely to eventually be overcome. Other challenges are in
addressing negative attitudes that result in vaccine hesitancy in
populations that would benefit from routine vaccination for out-
break type diseases to protect the wider community. The question
of how and whether wildlife populations should be vaccinated if
there is a zoonotic disease also needs to be addressed. Also, vacci-
nating livestock against diseases that first infect livestock and then
humans may be a highly effective way to prevent new human dis-
ease outbreaks, and the time and costs required to achieve licen-
sure of livestock vaccines are considerably lower than for human
vaccines. Vaccination of sheep, cattle and goats against RVFV, pigs
against Nipah, sheep against CCHFV and camels against MERS
could prevent human infections, but in the last two examples the
disease does not cause significant economic losses and vaccination
of livestock would be more difficult to introduce. Indeed, if the pri-
mary reason for livestock vaccination was to benefit human public
health, uptake by farmers would be low unless the benefits to the
community were clear and there was no commercial cost to the
farmer from vaccination.
The commercial and political challenges associated with epi-
demic diseases are significant. Since outbreaks are sporadic, invest-
ment tends to wane between outbreaks for the establishment of
emerging diseases vaccine research and development, especiallyprogressing prototype vaccines to proof of clinical efficacy. This
includes funding preclinical trials in nonhuman primates. The
new WHO and CEPI initiatives may overcome this problem but it
is important that this momentum towards the development of
effective vaccines is maintained even in the absence of a recent
outbreak. A second political challenge was highlighted in West
Africa and in the more recent outbreak in DRC, it is vital that local
communities are actively engaged in the vaccine testing process to
avoid disinformation [10,11]. Furthermore, it is crucial that local
government and healthcare agencies are fully integrated into any
disease outbreak response.
6. The funding landscape
Since 2016 the arrival of CEPI has provided strong financial sup-
port for the development of MERS, Nipah and Lassa vaccines
towards Phase 2 studies. With donor commitments of >US$700
million to date, CEPI still lacks the financial force of the Wellcome
Trust or the Gates Foundation (both of which are CEPI donors). The
US government, through civil and military programmes is the lar-
gest sponsor for vaccines on the priority list. Other significant state
contributors include the UK and Norway. China and India have
emerged as vaccine players, but government funding mechanisms
are not transparent at this time. Corporate vaccine funding remains
important, with global R&D spend estimated at up to US$7 billion
(on a purchasing power parity basis), but only for commercially
viable vaccines. As already discussed this is a particular issue for
vaccines against epidemic diseases. Vaccine development from
lab bench to registration can cost over US$1 billion, with large-
scale manufacturing plants costing another US$1 billion. Without
guaranteed sales, there is no incentive for a company to invest in
vaccine development. Only in the case of biosecurity vaccines, such
as anthrax or smallpox has the US government funded both man-
ufacture and purchase of vaccine stockpiles. There is a question
over whether the international public sector can guarantee pur-
chase and manufacture of priority list vaccines. The use of platform
technologies to develop both commercial and emerging pathogen
vaccines would obviate the need to build separate large-scale man-
ufacturing plants in order to produce a stockpile of the emerging
pathogen vaccine. Of note is the growth of Indian vaccine manufac-
ture – now making more doses each year than the top four vaccine
manufacturers – this is backed by supply to the Indian public sec-
tor market and growing sales to the international public sector (for
example UNICEF).
7. Conclusions
Although future outbreaks may result from as yet unknown or
poorly understood pathogens there is no excuse for governments
not to prepare for known threats. ‘Disease X’ represents the hardest
scenario to prepare for, however previous emerging disease out-
breaks have been associated with pathogens that have already
been described, or pathogens closely related to them so the explo-
ration of platform vaccine technologies for known priority patho-
gens is logical. Progressing vaccine development for known
threats to a field-ready state may also provide a springboard for
the development of vaccines against new, related, diseases. Clearly,
the time taken to develop even such modified vaccines requires
that other epidemiological approaches are used as the primary
focus of disease control. However, it is vital that these approaches
are integrated with the testing of new vaccines. To this end, it is
imperative to undertake phase I and II safety and immunogenicity
studies and produce vaccine stockpiles during inter-epidemic peri-
ods so that vaccines are available for rapid deployment to compli-
ment established outbreak control efforts and permit the collection
of valuable clinical efficacy data.
6246 R.J. Noad et al. / Vaccine 37 (2019) 6241–6247References
[1] Friedrich BM, Trefry JC, Biggins JE, Hensley LE, Honko AN, Smith DR, et al.
Potential vaccines and post-exposure treatments for filovirus infections.
Viruses 2012;4:1619–50. https://doi.org/10.3390/v4091619.
[2] Jones KE, Patel NG, Levy MA, Storeygard A, Balk D, Gittleman JL, et al. Global
trends in emerging infectious diseases. Nature 2008;451:990–3. https://doi.
org/10.1038/nature06536.
[3] Allen T, Murray KA, Zambrana-Torrelio C, Morse SS, Rondinini C, Di Marco M,
et al. Global hotspots and correlates of emerging zoonotic diseases. Nat
Commun 2017;8:1124. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-017-00923-8.
[4] Kennedy SB, Bolay F, Kieh M, Grandits G, Badio M, Ballou R, et al. Phase 2
placebo-controlled trial of two vaccines to prevent Ebola in Liberia. N Engl J
Med 2017;377:1438–47. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1614067.
[5] Henao-Restrepo AM, Camacho A, Longini IM, Watson CH, Edmunds WJ, Egger
M, et al. Efficacy and effectiveness of an rVSV-vectored vaccine in preventing
Ebola virus disease: final results from the Guinea ring vaccination, open-label,
cluster-randomised trial (Ebola Ça Suffit!). The Lancet 2017;389:505–18.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)32621-6.
[6] Gsell P-S, Camacho A, Kucharski AJ, Watson CH, Bagayoko A, Nadlaou SD, et al.
Ring vaccination with rVSV-ZEBOV under expanded access in response to an
outbreak of Ebola virus disease in Guinea, 2016: an operational and vaccine
safety report. Lancet Infect Dis 2017;17:1276–84. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S1473-3099(17)30541-8.
[7] Zhu F-C, Wurie AH, Hou L-H, Liang Q, Li Y-H, Russell JBW, et al. Safety and
immunogenicity of a recombinant adenovirus type-5 vector-based Ebola
vaccine in healthy adults in Sierra Leone: a single-centre, randomised, double-
blind, placebo-controlled, phase 2 trial. The Lancet 2017;389:621–8. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(16)32617-4.
[8] Mooney T, Smout E, Leigh B, Greenwood B, Enria L, Ishola D, et al. EBOVAC-
Salone: Lessons learned from implementing an Ebola vaccine trial in an Ebola-
affected country. Clinical Trials 2018:174077451878067. doi: 10.1177/
1740774518780678.
[9] Higgs ES, Dubey SA, Coller BAG, Simon JK, Bollinger L, Sorenson RA, et al.
Accelerating vaccine development during the 2013–2016 West African Ebola
Virus Disease Outbreak. Marburg- and Ebolaviruses, Springer, Cham; 2017, p.
229–61. doi: 10.1007/82_2017_53.
[10] Enria L, Lees S, Smout E, Mooney T, Tengbeh AF, Leigh B, et al. fairness and
trust: understanding and engaging with vaccine trial participants and
communities in the setting up the EBOVAC-Salone vaccine trial in Sierra
Leone. BMC Public Health 2016;16. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3799-
x.
[11] Kummervold PE, Schulz WS, Smout E, Fernandez-Luque L, Larson HJ.
Controversial Ebola vaccine trials in Ghana: a thematic analysis of critiques
and rebuttals in digital news. BMC Public Health 2017;17. https://doi.org/
10.1186/s12889-017-4618-8.
[12] Carter RJ, Idriss A, Widdowson M-A, Samai M, Schrag SJ, Legardy-Williams JK,
et al. Implementing a multisite clinical trial in the midst of an Ebola outbreak:
lessons learned from the Sierra Leone trial to introduce a vaccine against
Ebola. J Infect Dis 2018;217:S16–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/infdis/jix657.
[13] Hossmann S, Haynes AG, Spoerri A, Diatta ID, Aboubacar B, Egger M, et al. Data
management of clinical trials during an outbreak of Ebola virus disease.
Vaccine 2017. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.09.094.
[14] Plotkin S, Robinson JM, Cunningham G, Iqbal R, Larsen S. The complexity and
cost of vaccine manufacturing – an overview. Vaccine 2017;35:4064–71.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.06.003.
[15] WHO. Blueprint for R&D preparedness and response to public health
emergencies due to highly infectious pathogens. Geneva: WHO; 2015.
[16] NIAID Emerging Infectious Diseases/Pathogens | NIH: National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases n.d. <https://www.niaid.nih.gov/research/
emerging-infectious-diseases-pathogens> [accessed June 25, 2018].
[17] Agnandji ST, Fernandes JF, Bache EB, Obiang Mba RM, Brosnahan JS, Kabwende
L, et al. Safety and immunogenicity of rVSVDG-ZEBOV-GP Ebola vaccine in
adults and children in Lambaréné, Gabon: a phase I randomised trial. PLoS
Med 2017;14. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002402.
[18] Coltart CEM, Lindsey B, Ghinai I, Johnson AM, Heymann DL. The Ebola
outbreak, 2013–2016: old lessons for new epidemics. Philos Trans R Soc Lond
B Biol Sci 2017;372. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2016.0297.
[19] RDC. EBOLA RDC - Evolution de la riposte de l’épidémie d’Ebola au Jeudi 14
juin 2018. Democratic republic of Congo; 2018.
[20] Guy B, Briand O, Lang J, Saville M, Jackson N. Development of the Sanofi
Pasteur tetravalent dengue vaccine: One more step forward. Vaccine
2015;33:7100–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.09.108.
[21] Hadinegoro SR, Arredondo-García JL, Capeding MR, Deseda C,
Chotpitayasunondh T, Dietze R, et al. Efficacy and long-term safety of a
dengue vaccine in regions of endemic disease. Http://DxDoiOrg/101056/
NEJMoa1506223 2015. doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa1506223.
[22] Policy WHO. recommendations on the use of the first licensed dengue vaccine.
Wkly Epidemiol Rec 2018;23:329–44.
[23] Sáez-Llorens X, Tricou V, Yu D, Rivera L, Jimeno J, Villarreal AC, et al.
Immunogenicity and safety of one versus two doses of tetravalent dengue
vaccine in healthy children aged 2–17 years in Asia and Latin America: 18-
month interim data from a phase 2, randomised, placebo-controlled study.
Lancet Infect Dis 2018;18:162–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(17)
30632-1.[24] Song JY, Woo HJ, Cheong HJ, Noh JY, Baek LJ, Kim WJ. Long-term
immunogenicity and safety of inactivated Hantaan virus vaccine
(HantavaxTM) in healthy adults. Vaccine 2016;34:1289–95. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.vaccine.2016.01.031.
[25] Li Z, Zeng H, Wang Y, Zhang Y, Cheng L, Zhang F, et al. The assessment of
Hantaan virus-specific antibody responses after the immunization program for
hemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome in northwest China. Human Vac
Immunotherapeutics 2017;13:802–7. https://doi.org/10.1080/
21645515.2016.1253645.
[26] Zheng Y, Zhou B-Y, Wei J, Xu Y, Dong J-H, Guan L-Y, et al. Persistence of
immune responses to vaccine against haemorrhagic fever with renal
syndrome in healthy adults aged 16–60 years: results from an open-label2-
year follow-up study. Infect Dis 2018;50:21–6. https://doi.org/10.1080/
23744235.2017.1353704.
[27] Williamson ED. Plague. Vaccine 2009;27:D56–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.vaccine.2009.07.068.
[28] Pittman PR, Norris SL, Brown ES, Ranadive MV, Schibly BA, Bettinger GE, et al.
Rift Valley fever MP-12 vaccine Phase 2 clinical trial: Safety, immunogenicity,
and genetic characterization of virus isolates. Vaccine 2016;34:523–30.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2015.11.078.
[29] Njenga MK, Njagi L, Thumbi SM, Kahariri S, Githinji J, Omondi E, et al.
Randomized controlled field trial to assess the immunogenicity and safety of
rift valley fever clone 13 vaccine in livestock. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2015;9:.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pntd.0003550e0003550.
[30] Lo MM, Mbao V, Sierra P, Thiongane Y, Diop M, Donadeu M, et al. Safety and
immunogenicity of Onderstepoort Biological Products’ Rift Valley fever Clone
13 vaccine in sheep and goats under field conditions in Senegal. Onderstepoort
J Vet Res 2015;82:857.
[31] Warimwe GM, Gesharisha J, Carr BV, Otieno S, Otingah K, Wright D, et al.
Chimpanzee adenovirus vaccine provides multispecies protection against rift
valley fever. Sci Rep 2016;6:20617. https://doi.org/10.1038/srep20617.
[32] Dowall SD, Carroll MW, Hewson R. Development of vaccines against Crimean-
Congo haemorrhagic fever virus. Vaccine 2017;35:6015–23. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.05.031.
[33] Bond KA, Franklin LJ, Sutton B, Firestone SM. Q-Vax Q fever vaccine failures,
Victoria, Australia 1994–2013. Vaccine 2017;35:7084–7. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.vaccine.2017.10.088.
[34] Gilroy N, Formica N, Beers M, Egan A, Conaty S, Marmion B. Abattoir-
associated Q fever: a Q fever outbreak during a Q fever vaccination program.
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health n.d.; 25:362–7. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-842X.2001.tb00595.x.
[35] Modjarrad K, Lin L, George SL, Stephenson KE, Eckels KH, De La Barrera RA,
et al. Preliminary aggregate safety and immunogenicity results from three
trials of a purified inactivated Zika virus vaccine candidate: phase 1,
randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trials. The Lancet
2018;391:563–71. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)33106-9.
[36] Ewer K, Rampling T, Venkatraman N, Bowyer G, Wright D, Lambe T, et al. A
monovalent chimpanzee adenovirus Ebola vaccine boosted with MVA. N Engl J
Med 2016;374:1635–46. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMoa1411627.
[37] Ramsauer K, Schwameis M, Firbas C, Müllner M, Putnak RJ, Thomas SJ, et al.
Immunogenicity, safety, and tolerability of a recombinant measles-virus-
based chikungunya vaccine: a randomised, double-blind, placebo-controlled,
active-comparator, first-in-man trial. Lancet Infect Dis 2015;15:519–27.
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(15)70043-5.
[38] Chang L-J, Dowd KA, Mendoza FH, Saunders JG, Sitar S, Plummer SH, et al.
Safety and tolerability of chikungunya virus-like particle vaccine in healthy
adults: a phase 1 dose-escalation trial. The Lancet 2014;384:2046–52. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(14)61185-5.
[39] Gaudinski MR, Houser KV, Morabito KM, Hu Z, Yamshchikov G, Rothwell RS,
et al. Safety, tolerability, and immunogenicity of two Zika virus DNA vaccine
candidates in healthy adults: randomised, open-label, phase 1 clinical trials. The
Lancet 2018;391:552–62. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)33105-7.
[40] Jones S, Evans K, McElwaine-Johnn H, Sharpe M, Oxford J, Lambkin-Williams R,
et al. DNA vaccination protects against an influenza challenge in a double-
blind randomised placebo-controlled phase 1b clinical trial. Vaccine
2009;27:2506–12. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.vaccine.2009.02.061.
[41] Beigel JH, Voell J, Kumar P, Raviprakash K, Wu H, Jiao J-A, et al. Safety and
tolerability of a novel, polyclonal human anti-MERS coronavirus antibody
produced from transchromosomic cattle: a phase 1 randomised, double-blind,
single-dose-escalation study. Lancet Infect Dis 2018;18:410–8. https://doi.org/
10.1016/S1473-3099(18)30002-1.
[42] Stremlau MH, Andersen KG, Folarin OA, Grove JN, Odia I, Ehiane PE, et al.
Discovery of novel rhabdoviruses in the blood of healthy individuals from
West Africa. PLoS Negl Trop Dis 2015;9.. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pntd.0003631.
[43] Coffey LL, Page BL, Greninger AL, Herring BL, Russell RC, Doggett SL, et al.
Enhanced arbovirus surveillance with deep sequencing: identification of novel
rhabdoviruses and bunyaviruses in Australian mosquitoes. Virology 2014;448.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.virol.2013.09.026.
[44] Geldenhuys M, Mortlock M, Weyer J, Bezuidt O, Seamark ECJ, Kearney T, et al.
A metagenomic viral discovery approach identifies potential zoonotic and
novel mammalian viruses in Neoromicia bats within South Africa. PLoS ONE
2018;13. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0194527.
[45] Quick J, Loman NJ, Duraffour S, Simpson JT, Severi E, Cowley L, et al. Real-time,
portable genome sequencing for Ebola surveillance. Nature 2016;530:228–32.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nature16996.
R.J. Noad et al. / Vaccine 37 (2019) 6241–6247 6247[46] Quick J, Grubaugh ND, Pullan ST, Claro IM, Smith AD, Gangavarapu K, et al.
Multiplex PCR method for MinION and Illumina sequencing of Zika and other
virus genomes directly from clinical samples. Nat Protoc 2017;12:1261–76.
https://doi.org/10.1038/nprot.2017.066.
[47] Walter MC, Zwirglmaier K, Vette P, Holowachuk SA, Stoecker K,
Genzel GH, et al. MinION as part of a biomedical rapidly deployable
laboratory. J Biotechnol 2017;250:16–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbiotec.
2016.12.006.
[48] Russell JA, Campos B, Stone J, Blosser EM, Burkett-Cadena N, Jacobs JL.
Unbiased strain-typing of arbovirus directly from mosquitoes using nanoporesequencing: a field-forward biosurveillance protocol. Sci Rep 2018;8:5417.
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-018-23641-7.
[49] Goordial J, Altshuler I, Hindson K, Chan-Yam K, Marcolefas E, Whyte LG. In situ
field sequencing and life detection in remote (79260N) Canadian high arctic
permafrost ice wedge microbial communities. Front Microbiol 2017;8:2594.
https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2017.02594.
[50] Huttner A, Dayer J-A, Yerly S, Combescure C, Auderset F, Desmeules J, et al. The
effect of dose on the safety and immunogenicity of the VSV Ebola candidate
vaccine: a randomised double-blind, placebo-controlled phase 1/2 trial. Lancet
Infect Dis 2015;15:1156–66. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(15)00154-1.
